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RIFGWhat makes a proposition true or false has traditionally played an essential role in philosophical and linguis-
tic theories of meaning. A comprehensive neurobiological theory of language must ultimately be able to ex-
plain the combined contributions of real-world truth-value and discourse context to sentence meaning. This
fMRI study investigated the neural circuits that are sensitive to the propositional truth-value of sentences
about counterfactual worlds, aiming to reveal differential hemispheric sensitivity of the inferior prefrontal
gyri to counterfactual truth-value and real-world truth-value. Participants read true or false counterfactual
conditional sentences (“If N.A.S.A. had not developed its Apollo Project, the first country to land on the
moon would be Russia/America”) and real-world sentences (“Because N.A.S.A. developed its Apollo Project,
the first country to land on the moon has been America/Russia”) that were matched on contextual constraint
and truth-value. ROI analyses showed that whereas the left BA 47 showed similar activity increases to coun-
terfactual false sentences and to real-world false sentences (compared to true sentences), the right BA 47
showed a larger increase for counterfactual false sentences. Moreover, whole-brain analyses revealed a dis-
tributed neural circuit for dealing with propositional truth-value. These results constitute the first evidence
for hemispheric differences in processing counterfactual truth-value and real-world truth-value, and point
toward additional right hemisphere involvement in counterfactual comprehension.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Introduction
Language is a computationally remarkable, uniquely human system,
not to mention our principal and most efficient means of communica-
tion. It is often assumed that language evolved as an adaptation for
communication about the world (e.g., Pinker and Bloom, 1990). The ex-
change of information through statement of fact routinely affords veri-
fication processes through which people are able to agree or disagree
with what they read or hear, and draws upon our capacity to recall
word meanings and everyday facts and events (i.e., declarative memo-
ry; Eichenbaum, 2000). Conditions that make a proposition true or false
have traditionally played an essential role in philosophical and linguis-
tic theories of meaning (e.g., Montague, 1974; Tarski, 1944). Yet, while
language retains its power for exchanging information about the world,
its productive and combinatorial nature enables us to think and talk
about concepts beyond the real world. One prominent example of this
cognitive ability is counterfactual reasoning about what is in fact false
as if it were true (e.g., “If China had entered the Vietnam war,
then…”), which is pervasive in everyday life (e.g., Byrne, 2002;
Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Roese, 1997), and considered one of therights reserved.hallmarks of complex reasoning skills (e.g., Braine and O'Brien, 1991;
Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2009). Counterfactual comprehension is often
thought to require keeping in mind both what is true and what is
false (e.g., Byrne, 2002, 2007; for discussion see Evans, 2006; Evans et
al., 2005). This makes counterfactual comprehension an interesting
test-case for identifying the brain regions that are sensitive to proposi-
tional truth-value; whereas establishing the truth-value of a regular de-
clarative sentence requires a straightforward mapping of its
propositional meaning onto real-world knowledge that is stored in
long-term memory, establishing counterfactual truth-value requires
the online construction of a contextually relevant interpretation by
temporarily ‘bracketing’ factual knowledge about the real world (e.g.,
Searle, 1975; Stalnaker, 1968). The current fMRI study aims to unravel
the neural circuits that are sensitive to propositional truth-value, as
expressed in sentences about counterfactual worlds or about the real
world.
According to cognitive theories of text comprehension (e.g.,
Gernsbacher, 1997; Kintsch, 1988; Myers and O'Brien, 1998),
comprehension of counterfactual language requires the suppression
or inhibition of automatically activated world knowledge. All infor-
mation in memory that is related to unfolding linguistic input is
initially activated, and this network of co-activations is subsequently
pruned so that only the information that is most relevant to the
3434 M.S. Nieuwland / NeuroImage 59 (2012) 3433–3440ongoing interpretation is kept active. Similar assumptions have been
made in neurocognitive accounts of semantic processing during
language comprehension (e.g., Bookheimer, 2002; Hagoort, 2005;
Hagoort et al., 2009; Lau et al., 2008): word-elicited semantic informa-
tion is selected formessage-level semantic integration through the acti-
vation of relevant concepts and inhibition of competing concepts,
drawing upon activity in and interaction between the temporal and in-
ferior prefrontal brain regions that subserve semantic memory process-
es (see also Badre and Wagner, 2002; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997).
A canonical finding supporting the role of the left inferior frontal
gyrus for recruiting factual world knowledge during sentence com-
prehension was reported by Hagoort et al. (2004). In an fMRI
experiment, sentences that were regarded by Dutch participants as
false (e.g., “Dutch trains are white”) elicited common activity
increases in the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG, BA 45/47) as
sentences that contained lexical-semantic anomalies (e.g., “Dutch
trains are sour”, which is not only false but also makes no sense
given the semantic constraints of the words ‘trains’ and ‘sour’), each
compared to true sentences (e.g., “Dutch trains are yellow”). Later
studies replicated and extended these findings by showing that
world knowledge violations elicit additional activations in other
brain regions, most notably in right inferior prefrontal cortex, middle
and superior prefrontal gyrus, middle temporal gyrus, and the inferior
parietal lobule (e.g., Groen et al., 2010; Menenti et al., 2009; Tesink et
al., 2009, 2011). These findings testify to the fact that an extended
network of brain regions is sensitive to sentence truth-value, even if
participants are not explicitly instructed to establish truth-value.
These findings are consistent with a recent neurocognitive frame-
work of language comprehension, the Memory-Unification-Control
framework (e.g., Hagoort, 2005; Hagoort et al., 2009), which posits
that the left inferior frontal cortex (with additional support from
other areas) has top-down control over the combinatorial semantic
processes that compose multi-word utterances from word-elicited in-
formation as represented by the left middle temporal cortex. Moreover,
knowledge from different sources and modalities (e.g., speaker identi-
ty, real-world knowledge, discourse context) is immediately brought to
bear on utterance interpretation, by the same brain system that com-
bines the meanings of individual words into a larger whole (Hagoort,
2005; see also Hagoort and Van Berkum, 2007). However, while
many event-related potential (ERP) studies have revealed a rapid inter-
action between world knowledge and discourse context (e.g., Hald et
al., 2007; Nieuwland and Kuperberg, 2008; Nieuwland and Van
Berkum, 2006; Van Berkum et al., 2008, 2009; for eye-tracking and
ERP results on online counterfactual comprehension, see Ferguson et
al., 2008; Ferguson and Sanford, 2008), the neuralmechanisms that un-
derlie the unification of real-world knowledge with discourse context
remain understudied. A comprehensive neurobiological theory of lan-
guage must ultimately be able to explain the combined contributions
of real-world truth-value and discourse context.
In the only fMRI study thus far that examined these issues
(Menenti et al., 2009), sentences that – without any context – were
regarded as false or true (e.g., “Donald Duck's nephews are thieves/
boy scouts”) were preceded by either a counterfactual (i.e. fictional)
context that was congruent with the false sentences (e.g., a story
about early sketches wherein the three nephews were depicted as
young bad boys who rob old ladies) or by a neutral context that
was congruent with the true sentences (e.g., a story about early
sketches where they were depicted as helping old ladies). The results
showed that the impact of world knowledge violations (false minus
true sentences) was more reduced due to counterfactual context in
the RIFG than in the LIFG: world knowledge violations did not elicit
effects in RIFG but remained to elicit significant effects in the LIFG
despite the counterfactual context. Additionally, in the left angular
gyrus, the effect of the world knowledge violation was actually
reversed following the counterfactual context, suggesting that this
brain region was most sensitive to discourse coherence. The authorsoffered a tentative interpretation that whereas the LIFG continues to
relate incoming information to prior world knowledge, the RIFG is
more sensitive to whether incoming information is congruent with
the discourse (however, counterfactual context did not reverse the
effect of world knowledge in the RIFG). This functional division of
labor between LIFG and RIFG is congruent with a body of literature
on right hemisphere involvement in high-level aspects of language
(e.g., discourse processing and pragmatic language comprehension;
Bookheimer, 2002; Jung-Beeman, 2005; Mason and Just, 2006; Ferstl
et al., 2008). One influential account holds that the right hemisphere
processes incoming information more coarsely and is therefore more
sensitive to unusual or novel semantic relationships (e.g., Jung-
Beeman, 2005). Semantic selection processes, which inhibit compet-
ing concepts to select one concept for message-level semantic
integration, may then draw upon the RIFG more strongly when the
information that needs to be inhibited is more active in the right
hemisphere (e.g., Jung-Beeman, 2005; see also Faust and
Gernsbacher, 1996, for discussion). Perhaps in a similar vein, neuro-
cognitive research on reasoning has revealed right lateral prefrontal
activations when participants inhibit their world knowledge in
order to arrive at a logically sound conclusion (Goel and Dolan,
2003; see also Goel, 2007).
The current fMRI study therefore aimed to address the following
question: Are the LIFG and RIFG differentially engaged in balancing the
recruitment of information in long-term memory with the online con-
struction of a discourse-relevant and contextualized interpretation? Ad-
ditionally, and more generally, what brain regions are sensitive to
sentence truth-value? This study aims to answer those questions in the
context of counterfactual sentence comprehension, by directly compar-
ing the neural processing consequences of sentences that are false with
regard to a hypothetical, counterfactual world with those of sentences
that are false with regard to the current real-world knowledge. Partici-
pants read counterfactual and real-world sentences in which a specific
critical word, belonging to a word pair, rendered the sentence false or
true. For eachword pair, oneword rendered the counterfactual sentence
truewhile rendering the real-world sentence false, and vice versa for the
other word (see Tables 1 and 2). The contextual constraints were
matched for counterfactual and real-world sentences, so that, on aver-
age, critical words that rendered sentences true were equally expected
for each sentence type, and so that these sentence types were similar
in truth-value (as had been established in an independent sentence com-
pletion pre-test and truth-value rating pre-test, respectively; see
Materials and methods section). The results from an earlier ERP study
with these materials (Nieuwland and Martin, 2012) showed that
words that rendered sentences false elicited identical N400
effects (compared to words that rendered sentences true) in counterfac-
tual sentences and real-world sentences. These results suggest that, if de-
scribed consequences are true and predictable given the counterfactual
premise, real-world knowledge does not impede or delay counterfactual
comprehension, at least at the moment that propositional truth-value
can be established. However, fMRI might reveal differences between
counterfactual or real-world sentence comprehension processes that
occur at a wider timescale and account for the larger network that is en-
gaged for establishing propositional truth-value in both contexts.
The current study is the first to deal directly with the comprehen-
sion of counterfactual conditional sentences. The main prediction of
the current study is that the LIFG and RIFG will be differentially sen-
sitive to real-world and counterfactual truth-value: the RIFG being
more sensitive to counterfactual truth-value than the LIFG, but
being equally or perhaps less sensitive to real-world truth-value
(e.g., Hagoort et al., 2004).
An additional, more general objective of this study is to reveal the
neural circuits that are sensitive to truth-value, using a design where
propositional truth-value of the two sentence types hinges on oppo-
site pairs of critical words, thereby controlling for the impact of differ-
ences in lexical-associative factors between words in true and false
Table 1
Example sentences and approximate translations with average truth-value rating and
cloze value of the critical word for each condition.
This table is adapted from Nieuwland and Martin (2011).






Si la N.A.S.A. no hubiera desarrollado
su proyecto Apollo, el primer país en
pisar la luna habría sido Rusia
seguramente.
5.62 (.97) 68 (22)
“If N.A.S.A. had not developed its
Apollo Project, the first country to




Si la N.A.S.A. no hubiera desarrollado
su proyecto Apollo, el primer país en
pisar la luna habría sido América
seguramente.
1.68 (.74) –
“If N.A.S.A. had not developed its
Apollo Project, the first country to




Como la N.A.S.A. desarrolló su
proyecto Apollo, el primer país en
pisar la luna ha sido América
seguramente.
5.50 (1.03) 65 (25)
“Because N.A.S.A. developed its
Apollo Project, the first country to




Como la N.A.S.A. desarrolló su
proyecto Apollo, el primer país en
pisar la luna ha sido Rusia
seguramente.
1.55 (.64) –
“Because N.A.S.A. developed its
Apollo Project, the first country to
land on the moon was Russia
surely.”
Filler sentence La gastronomía vasca está muy bien
considerada, es conocida en todo el
mundo.
“Basque gastronomy is highly
regarded, it is known around the
world”
Note. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Critical words are underlined for
expository purposes. For truth-value rating, 1=False, 7=True.
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to increase activation in left and right inferior prefrontal gyrus, and
possibly in left middle frontal gyrus, left middle temporal gyrus and
in left inferior parietal cortex (e.g., Groen et al., 2010; Hagoort et al.,
2004; Menenti et al., 2009; Tesink et al., 2009, 2011).
Materials and methods
Participants
Twenty-eight right-handed students (14 males, mean age=22.9 -
years) participated in this study for monetary compensation. All par-
ticipants were native Spanish speakers, had normal or corrected-to-Table 2




5. If N.A.S.A. had not developed its Apollo Project, the
first country to land on the moon would have been
1. Russia
surely.
5. If N.A.S.A. had not developed its Apollo Project, the





6. Because N.A.S.A. developed its Apollo Project, the
first country to land on the moon was
3. America
surely.
6. Because N.A.S.A. developed its Apollo Project, the
first country to land on the moon was
4. Russia
surely.normal vision, and gave written informed consent. Participants had
no neurological or psychiatric disorders, nor had they seen the mate-
rials before in an earlier experiment. Four participants were excluded
from the final analysis due to excessive movement during the
experiment.
Development and pretest of materials
Materials were identical to those used by Nieuwland and Martin
(2012), and were selected from 133 Spanish sentence quadruplets
with two counterfactual and two real-world sentences (see
Table 1). Critical words were predicates, nouns or proper names,
and never sentence-final. Counterfactual sentences described hypo-
thetical consequences of common-knowledge historical events not
having taken place, whereas real-world sentences described actual
consequences of these events. The two sentence types differed in
three respects: counterfactuals started with the conditional ‘Si’, con-
tained a negative premise, and involved conditional verb tense, real-
world sentences started with ‘Como’ (‘because’), were affirmative,
and contained no conditional verb tense.
We first established the expectedness of critical words. Twenty
students of the University of the Basque Country completed one of
two lists with one version of each item truncated before the critical
word. They were instructed to complete the sentence with the first
sensible word coming to mind. Cloze value was computed as the per-
centage of participants who used the intended critical word.
We subsequently determined whether sentences (truncated after
the critical word) were, on average, regarded as true or false. Twenty-
four different students evaluated one of four counterbalanced sen-
tence lists containing only one condition per quadruplet, and decided
whether the sentences were true (1=False, 7=True), skipping any
they could not evaluate.
Based on these results, we excluded quadruplets with low cloze
value, containing true/false sentences rated below/over 4, or sen-
tences skipped by more than two participants. In the ultimate set of
120 quadruplets, true and false sentences had similar cloze values
and ratings across conditions (see Table 1), and critical words were
matched for mean log frequency (CT/RWT=1.44/1.55; p=.11;
Davis & Perea, 2005) and word length (CT/RWT=6.65/6.89 letters;
p= .24). Average counterfactual sentence length was 16.2 words
(SD=2.8), and real-world sentence length was 14.6 words
(SD=2.7).
We created four counterbalanced lists so that each sentence
appeared in only one condition per list, but in all conditions equally
often across lists. Within each list, items were pseudo-randomly
mixed with 60 filler sentences to limit succession of identical sen-
tence types while matching trial types on average list position. The
filler sentences did not start with ‘Si’ or ‘Como’, and consisted of
two clauses separated by a comma.
Experimental procedure
While inside the scanner, participants read sentences presented
via back-projection onto the middle of the screen, and would view
the stimuli via a mirror attached to the head coil. They were
instructed to minimize movement and read the sentences attentively,
and to answer yes/no comprehension questions that appeared after
some of the sentences with a left- or right-hand button-press (left-
or right-hand assignment for yes/no was counterbalanced across
participants).
Four trial lists were used (each subject was pseudorandomly
assigned to one of the four trial lists, so that the lists were equally dis-
tributed across subjects). For the first list, 30 items from each condi-
tion were pseudo-randomly mixed with the filler sentences such
that no trial type occurred more than three times consecutively and
trials of each type were matched on average list position. The other
1 The coordinates were based on the results reported by Tesink et al. (2011) rather
than those reported by Hagoort et al. (2004) or Menenti et al. (2009). Hagoort et al.
reported coordinates that referred to the common activation for semantic violations
and world knowledge violations compared to the correct condition, and may thus
not be optimal for investigating the current effects of sentence truth-value (for exam-
ple, semantic violations and world knowledge violations are associated with different
peak activity coordinates, as reported by Tesink et al.). In addition, while Hagoort et
al. only reported a single cluster of common activation in the LIFG, the Tesink et al.
study revealed bilateral effects of truth-value for the same items. Moreover, while
Tesink et al. reported effects of truth-value of single sentences, the Menenti et al. study
involved multi-sentence stories rather than single sentences, and the reported coordi-
nates in that study might thus not be optimal for the comparisons in the current study.
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180 sentences was divided into 6 sessions (presented in fixed-order
across trial lists) of approximately 8 min each. Following the third
session, participants exited the scanner for a short break.
Participants silently read sentences presented in black letters on a
light-gray background. The first clause was presented as a whole for
4000 ms, followed by a fixation cross and blank screen each for
500 ms, and the second clause was presented word-by-word
(screen-centered, 400 ms word duration, 200 ms inter-word-
interval). Following every final word, a blank screen was presented
for 500 ms, followed by either a fixation period of variable duration
(5–8 s) or by first a yes/no comprehension question and then a fixa-
tion period. During the fixation period, participants fixate on a cross
in the middle of the screen and awaited the start of the next trial. If
a comprehension question appeared, it was presented for 2 s, fol-
lowed by a response screen that disappeared upon button-press or
after 1 s. The questions only served to keep participants more atten-
tive. They always probed their world knowledge related to words in
the sentence (e.g., “Does N.A.S.A. have a headquarters in Houston?”)
but did not probe knowledge that was critical for understanding the
sentences, and did not probe about the counterfactual premise.
These 60 questions (30 requiring a ‘yes’ button-press response)
were distributed across sentence types. Participants performed with
92% accuracy on average (range across subjects 77–98%).
fMRI data acquisition, preprocessing and analysis
Imaging took place on a 3-T MR scanner (Siemens TrioTim) with
echoplanar imaging capability. Head motion was minimized using
pillows and cushions around the head. Each subject then viewed
one of the four counterbalanced sentence lists with the sentence trials
and fixation trials, across six functional runs. Each functional run
lasted around 570 s during which whole head T2⁎-weighted EPI-
BOLD fMRI data were acquired using an interleaved even acquisition
EPI sequence (TR=2 s; TE=30 ms; flip angle=90°; 32 axial slices;
matrix size=64×64; slice thickness=3 mm; slice gap=0.75 mm;
transverse orientation acquisition; isotropic voxel-size=
3×3×3 mm3). After the functional runs, subjects underwent one
high-resolution 3D structural scan, using a T1-weighted MPRAGE se-
quence (176 transverse slices; volume TR=2530 ms; TE=2.97 ms;
TI=1100 ms; transverse orientation acquisition; flip angle=7°;
slice matrix=256×256; slice thickness=1 mm, slice gap=0.5 mm).
Image preprocessing and statistical analysis was performed using
the SPM8 software (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk). The functional
EPI-BOLD contrast images were realigned, and the mean of realigned
images was co-registered with the corresponding structural MRI by
using mutual information optimization. These images were subse-
quently slice-time corrected, spatially normalized (images were re-
sampled with a 2×2×2 mm3 resolution), transformed into a com-
mon space (MNI-T1 template), and spatially filtered with an isotropic
3D Gaussian kernel (10 mm FWHM). The data were analyzed using
the general linear model and statistical parametric mapping. We in-
cluded the following explanatory variables (see Table 2, for a sche-
matic representation): each of the four critical conditions
(1=Counterfactual True, 2=Counterfactual False, 3=Real-world
True, 4=Real-world True) modeled separately from the onset of
the critical word with a duration extending to the end of the sentence
including the sentence-final word, counterfactual context modeled
from the onset of each counterfactual sentence with a duration
extending to the offset of the pre-critical word (pooled across coun-
terfactual true and false sentences because they were identical up to
the critical word, number 5 in Table 2), real-world context modeled
from the onset of each real-world sentence with a duration up
extending to the offset of the pre-critical word (pooled across real-
world true and false sentences because they were identical up to
the critical word, number 6 in Table 2). Importantly, pre-criticalword differences between counterfactual and real-world sentences
in presence/absence of negation and in sentence length can thus not
account for observed differences in the critical regions. The fixation
period was modeled from the onset of the fixation mark until it disap-
peared from the screen. Effects of no-interest included one regressor
that pooled all filler sentences (modeled from sentence onset to off-
set), one regressor for the comprehension question and response
screen, and additional regressors for session and subject effects. The
explanatory variables were modeled as a fixed response (box-car)
waveform temporally convolved with the canonical HRF along with
its temporal derivative (Friston et al., 1998), while controlling for se-
rial correlations. Low-frequency noise was removed with a high-pass
filter (time constant 128 s).
Region-of-interest analysis
Given the a priori hypothesis about the role of the IFG, a region-of-
interest (ROI) analysis was performed using the Marsbar toolbox
(Brett et al., 2002) by extracting average parameter estimates per
condition and per subject for 2 LIFG ROIs and their right hemisphere
counterparts. These ROIs were based on the results of a related
study that reported activations within different subregions of the
left and right IFG (pars orbitalis/triangularis; BA 45/47) for world
knowledge violations in healthy adults during sentence processing
(Tesink et al., 2011; see also Tesink et al., 2009, for similar results).1
Signal was sampled from 2 spherical ROIs with a 10 mm radius cen-
tered on coordinates [−44 29 12] and [36 26–8] for BA 45 and 47 re-
spectively (see Fig. 1a). These ROI center coordinates approximated
the average of peak voxel coordinates reported by Tesink et al.
(2011) (BA 45: [−40 30 4] and [−44 28 14], BA 47: [38 22–10] and
[−34 30–8]), with a small adjustment to avoid ROI overlap. A 2(Con-
text: counterfactual, real-world) by 2(Propositional truth-value: true,
false) by 2(hemisphere: left, right) repeated measures analysis of var-
iance (ANOVA) was performed on the extracted parameter estimates
per ROI.
Whole-brain analysis
In addition to ROI analyses, a whole-brain analysis was performed
to examine whether other brain regions were sensitive to counterfac-
tual and real-world truth-value. Average parameter estimates for the
explanatory variables were generated for each subject, and subjected
to a second-level random effects analysis with non-sphericity correc-
tion for correlated repeated measures, according to the 2 (Context:
counterfactual, real-world) by 2 (Truth-value: true, false) design.
The results of the random effects analyses were thresholded at
P=0.001 (uncorrected) and the cluster-size statistics were used as
the test statistic, only clusters are reported that were significant at
P≤0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons using the false discovery
rate (FDR; Genovese et al., 2002). All local maxima are reported as
MNI coordinates (Evans et al., 1993). Anatomical location and ap-
proximate Brodmann areas and were determined using the AAL tool-


















Fig. 1. (left graph) ROIs in the current study. Two 10-mm sphere centered at MNI coordinates [−44 29 12] (BA 45, top) and [−36 26–8] (BA 47, bottom) and their right hemisphere
equivalents. (right graph) Effect of propositional truth-value in counterfactual sentences (dark gray bars, ‘CF’) and real-world sentences (light gray bars, ‘RW’) in four ROIs (left/
right, BA 45/47). Displayed are the false-minus-true difference score (and 95% confidence intervals) in average beta parameter value per sentence type and per ROI. (*pb .05).
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ROI analysis
Differences in parameter estimates corresponding to the effect of
truth-value (false minus true sentences) per sentence type and ROI
are plotted in Fig. 1b. Overall, false sentences elicited more activity
than true sentences in the BA 45 ROIs (F(1,23)=31.43, pb .001) and
in the B47 ROIs (F(1,23)=80.98, pb .001). In the BA 45 ROIs the effect
of truth-value was similar for counterfactual and real-world sen-
tences (F(1,23)=.005, p=.95), and did not differ between the left
and right ROI (F(1,23)=1.11, p=.30). In contrast, in the BA 47 ROIs
the effect of truth-value was larger for counterfactual sentences
than for real-world sentences (F(1,23)=5.08, p=.034), but this pat-
tern differed for the left and right ROI, as reflected in a significant
3-way interaction effect (F(1,23)=4.58, p=.043). The effect of
truth-value was greater for counterfactual sentences than for real-
world sentences in the right BA47 ROI (F(1,23)=6.90, p=.015),
but not in the left BA 47 ROI (F(1,23)=.13, p=.73). This differential
effect of truth-value in the right BA 47 ROI for the two sentence types
was of a quantitative nature rather than a qualitative: the effect of
truth-value was statistically significant for each sentence type, but it
was stronger in counterfactual sentences (F(1,23)=6.83, pb .001)
than in real-world sentences (F(1,23)=2.21, p=.037). This differ-
ence was driven mainly by a large response to counterfactual false
sentences, which was larger than the response to real-world false
sentences (F(1,23)=3.59, p=.002), while the responses to counter-
factual true and real-world true sentences did not differ (F(1,23)=
1.06, p=.31).
Whole-brain analysis
The whole-brain analysis did not reveal any significant clusters for
the interaction between Context and Propositional truth-value. How-
ever, because the ROI analyses revealed differential effects of truth-
value in counterfactual and real-world sentences, the following linear
contrasts (and their reverse counterparts) were further specified:
Counterfactual False>Counterfactual True, Real-world False>Real-world True, Counterfactual>Real-world. Consistent with the absence
of a significant Context by Propositional truth-value interaction effect,
the false minus true contrast elicited similar activation increases for
counterfactual and real-world sentences (see Table 3 and Fig. 2).
These clusters were located in left and right inferior frontal gyrus
(LIFG and RIFG, BA 45 and BA 47) extending into the middle frontal
gyrus (MFG, BA 8/9), left middle temporal gyrus (MTG, BA 21), medi-
al parts of the superior frontal gyrus (SFG, BA 6/8), and the left inferi-
or parietal lobule (IPL, BA 40). For real-world sentences an additional
cluster was located in the caudate nucleus. These results are a clear
replication of effects of world-knowledge violations as reported by
Hagoort and colleagues (Groen et al., 2010; Hagoort et al., 2004;
Menenti et al., 2009; Tesink et al., 2009, 2011).
Finally, the reverse contrast yielded no clusters that showed more
activity to true sentences than to false sentences. However, there was
a main effect of Context: counterfactual sentences overall elicited
more activity than real-world sentences in the left and right middle
temporal gyrus, a finding that is consistent with the results of
Menenti et al. (2009), who reported more activation in this region
for counterfactual context compared to real-world context. Consis-
tent with the main effect of context, the contrast (Counterfactual Fal-
se>Real-world False) elicited a significant cluster in LMTG (k=440,
peak voxel coordinates [−48 −32 4]), as did the contrast (Counter-
factual True>Real-world True) (k=1421, peak voxel coordinates
[−50 −24 −14]). Consistent with the interaction effect observed
in the ROI analysis, the contrast (Counterfactual False>Real-world
False) elicited a significant cluster in RIFG (k=837, peak voxel coor-
dinates [36 28–2]), whereas the contrast (Counterfactual True>Real-
world True) did not.
Discussion
This fMRI study investigated the neural circuits that are sensitive
to the propositional truth-value of sentences about counterfactual
worlds or about the real world, and aimed to reveal hemispheric dif-
ferences between the inferior prefrontal gyri in processing counter-
factual truth-value and real-world truth-value. BOLD responses
were compared to critical words that rendered counterfactual or
Table 3
Results from the Whole-brain analysis.









a. Results from the Whole-brain analysis for the contrast Counterfactual False>Counterfac-
tual True*
LIFG (pars orbitalis) 47 .000 4765 6.92 −36 22 −6
47 6.62 −44 26 −10
LIFG (pars triangularis) 45 6.57 −40 22 4
RIFG (pars orbitalis) 47 .000 4198 6.86 32 26 −4
R Middle frontal gyrus 9 6.33 52 20 40
RIFG (pars orbitalis) 47 6.26 46 30 −10
Medial Superior frontal
gyrus
6 .000 3658 5.97 −6 22 56
8 5.96 2 38 50
L Superior frontal gyrus 6 5.95 −14 12 58
L Middle temporal gyrus 21 .000 1083 5.49 −48 −34 −4
4.98 −52 −26 −8
4.17 −64 −48 4
L Inferior parietal lobule 40 .000 968 4.98 −54 −52 48
4.76 −50 −48 38
3.88 −64 −46 40
b. Results from the Whole-brain analysis for the contrast Real-world False>Real-
world True
LIFG (pars orbitalis) 47/11 .000 5631 7.21 −46 46 −14
L Middle frontal gyrus 8 6.04 −50 14 44
LIFG (pars triangularis) 45 5.75 −50 24 −2
L Middle temporal gyrus 21 .000 886 6.72 −50 −24 −12
L Inferior parietal lobule 40 .000 2085 5.90 −48 −50 34
5.81 −54 −52 48
4.60 −38 −56 46
Medial Superior frontal
gyrus
9 .000 2525 5.11 −10 36 32
L SMA 8 4.94 −2 22 58
L Superior frontal gyrus 6 4.83 −14 26 38
RIFG (pars orbitalis) 47/11 .000 2444 4.99 46 46 −12
R Middle frontal gyrus 8 4.91 42 18 38
9 4.57 36 16 30
R Inferior parietal lobule 40 .003 557 4.60 48 −56 42
R Angular gyrus 40 4.09 46 −52 34
R Caudate .006 456 4.13 10 4 14
L Caudate 3.89 −10 8 10
c. Main effect of context (Counterfactual>Real-world)
L Middle temporal gyrus 21 .000 2365 6.10 −50 −24 −14
5.71 −48 −32 4
5.01 −52 −2 −24
R Middle temporal gyrus 21 .064 338 4.73 52 −18 −18
4.38 44 −16 −14
3.94 50 −8 −12
* P-values correspond to cluster-level statistical tests with FDR correction at P≤0.05. T-
values correspond to the local maxima (multiple local maxima are reported when they
are more than 8 mm apart).
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real-world) by 2 (Truth-value: true, false) design. The main result of
this study, as evident from ROI analyses involving the left and right
BA 45 and 47, was that whereas the left BA 47 showed similar activity
increases to counterfactual false and to real-world false sentences
(compared to true sentences), the RIFG BA 47 showed a larger in-
crease for counterfactual sentences then for real-world sentences.2
No such pattern was found for the left and right BA 45 ROIs. The sec-
ond contribution of this study is that, across both sentence types, false
sentences elicited activation increases compared to true sentences in
several brain regions linked to semantic processing (left and right IFG,
superior and middle frontal gyrus, middle temporal gyrus, and inferi-
or parietal cortex; Bookheimer, 2002; Hagoort et al., 2009; Lau et al.,
2008; Price, 2010).
The fact that the RIFG was more sensitive to counterfactual truth-
value than to real-world truth-value is consistent with greater RIFG
sensitivity to counterfactual discourse coherence (Menenti et al.,
2009). However, it is important to note that the hemispheric differ-
ences for processing counterfactual truth-value and real-world
truth-value emerged as a function of the LIFG and RIFG BA 47 re-
sponses to real-world truth-value, whereas these regions showed
similar effects of counterfactual truth-value. Larger effects of truth-
value of ‘simple’ sentences in LIFG compared to RIFG have already
been reported in similar studies, along with stronger effects of
lexical-semantic violations in LIFG than in RIFG (e.g., Groen et al.,
2010; Hagoort et al., 2004; Tesink et al., 2009). The current larger sen-
sitivity of the RIFG to counterfactual truth-value than to real-world
truth-value may thus reflect increased semantic processing due to
the semantic complexity of the counterfactual false sentences.
Whereas real-world false sentences increase semantic processing as-
sociated with rejecting the sentence as being false based on factual
knowledge, counterfactual false sentences may elicit extended se-
mantic processing to reject the sentence as being false (e.g., America
would probably not be the first to land on the moon if it hadn't been
for N.A.S.A.) despite the fact that the sentence is congruent with actu-
al facts about the world (e.g., America did land on the moon first). The
larger effect in the RIFG for counterfactual truth-value is consistent
with right hemisphere activations associated with comprehending
contextual and figurative meaning and with complex sentences and
discourse level processing (e.g., Kuperberg et al., 2006; Stringaris et
al., 2006; Xu et al., 2005 see Jung-Beeman, 2005; Mason and Just,
2006). On one interpretation, this effect may reflect intensified se-
mantic selection (i.e., inhibiting competing concepts to select one
concept for message-level semantic integration) to process informa-
tion that is activated in the right hemisphere (e.g., Jung-Beeman,
2005). Perhaps that real-world consistent but contextually irrelevant
concepts (‘America’) are more strongly activated in the right hemi-
sphere, and that falsifying counterfactual sentences in face of these
‘lures’ therefore engages more processing resources in this
hemisphere.
Whereas in the current study counterfactual false and real-world
false sentences similarly elicited widespread effects, Menenti et al.
(2009) reported a reduced effect of world knowledge in the IFG2 Whereas the counterfactual sentences and real-world sentences also differed in
sentence length and the presence of negation, these differences do not explain the cur-
rently observed effects. First of all, these differences occurred before the critical words,
and their effects were accounted for by separate. The part of the sentence that preced-
ed the critical words was modeled separately from the part of the sentence from the
critical word onwards. Because this part of the sentence was identical for the true
and false sentences, this regressor pooled the data from the true and false sentences
(see Table 2). Importantly, activity associated with these differences is thus accounted
for in the model in a way that it cannot explain the observed effects of the critical
words. The regressors that correspond to the critical sentence parts involve exactly
the same words for the four conditions. Secondly, the critical comparisons in the ROI
analysis showed that there were no differences between the counterfactual true and
real-world true conditions, suggesting that these differences did not affect the ob-
served results.following the counterfactual context, and while this reduction was
greater in the RIFG than in the LIFG, the effect of world knowledge
in the RIFG was not reversed by counterfactual context. These differ-
ences in the effects of counterfactual context may be explained by the
difference in counterfactual constraints in the two studies. Counter-
factual true continuations in the current study were, on average, as
expected as real-world true continuations, and they received similar
truth-value ratings. In contrast, the counterfactual discourse context
used by Menenti and colleagues made the counterfactual continua-
tion less unexpected (43% compared to 0% following the real-world
context) yet the real-world continuation remained to be relatively
expected too despite the counterfactual context (34% compared to
77% following the real-world context). Thus, absence of a counterfac-
tual context effect in the RIFG may reflect the fact that world knowl-
edge violations and correct sentences were equally unexpected and/
or plausible. In the current study, one factor that may have contribut-
ed to making counterfactual contexts as ‘strong’ as the real-world















Fig. 2. Effect of propositional truth-value in counterfactual sentences (A) and in real-world sentences (B). Pair-wise comparisons for false minus true sentences across all subjects
(thresholded at P≤0.001 uncorrected). Labels are provided only for significant clusters (corrected for multiple comparisons with a cluster-level FDR P≤0.05). LIFG = Left inferior
frontal gyrus. RIFG = Right inferior frontal gyrus. SFG = Superior frontal gyrus. MFG = Middle frontal gyrus. MTG = Middle temporal gyrus. IPL = Inferior parietal lobule.
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tionals. Whereas Menenti et al. created novel and unfamiliar fictional
stories, alternative endings to known historical events may be more
easily computed, for example because relevant information is also
part of our real-world knowledge (e.g., the fact that the Soviets
were also making substantial progress in landing somebody on the
moon at the time that the USA managed to do so). Theories of coun-
terfactual comprehension indeed assume that the more dissimilar a
counterfactual world is to the real world the more difficulty people
have in reasoning about them (e.g., Lewis, 1973; see Byrne, 2007,
for discussion).
The current findings are also in line with recent ERP findings that
suggest that, rather than being ‘message-blind’, the right hemisphere
is sensitive to discourse-level comprehension (e.g., Coulson et al.,
2005; Federmeier et al., 2008). In an earlier ERP version of the current
study, counterfactual false sentences and real-world false sentences
elicited identical N400 effects compared to their respective true ver-
sion, reflecting the fact that incoming words are being mapped onto
the counterfactual context without any delay (Nieuwland and
Martin, 2012). Although different participants and dissimilar tech-
niques limit generalization across the two sets of results, these results
combined may suggest that the increased RIFG response does not re-
flect the early semantic processes that are thought to be indexed by
the N400 ERP. This is consistent with recent claims in the literature
that neural sources underlying N400 modulations lie in temporal
lobes rather than inferior prefrontal regions (see Lau et al., 2008;
Van Petten and Luka, 2006). In the current study, counterfactual and
real-world sentences elicited similar effects of truth-value in the left
middle temporal gyrus. Importantly, fMRI has a low temporal resolu-
tion and in the current study the condition regressors were modeled
from critical word onset to sentence offset, picking up on effects out-
side the critical-word time-locked N400 time window. Therefore, the
current RIFG effects reflect differences between processing of coun-
terfactual truth-value and real-world truth-value that occur at a
wider timescale.
The extended pattern of activations that was associated with false
sentences independently replicates BOLD responses to world knowl-
edge violations as reported by Hagoort and colleagues (Groen et al.,
2010; Hagoort et al., 2004; Menenti et al., 2009; Tesink et al., 2009,
2011). Moreover, the current study generated a similar pattern of re-
sults for counterfactual and real-world sentences, despite the fact that
effects of propositional truth-value for these sentence types were
computed over opposite pairs of critical words (thereby effectively
controlling for lower-level lexical-associate factors that are also
known to modulate activity in inferior frontal gyri, see Lau et al.,
2008).Consistent with earlier studies, false sentences induced in-
creased demands on a wider semantic processing network even
when participants are not explicitly instructed to determine truth-value. These results may reflect increased semantic retrieval of rele-
vant information in long-term memory (e.g., of the correct informa-
tion) from medial temporal lobe, governed by the inferior prefrontal
gyri (e.g., Bookheimer, 2002; Hagoort et al., 2009; Lau et al., 2008).
This is also consistent with the extensive structural and functional
connectivity as observed for within the fronto-temporal language
network and for connectivity for regions in this network with dorso-
lateral and inferior parietal regions (e.g., Turken and Dronkers, 2011;
Xiang et al., 2010). The specific role of these other regions in the
reported network remains elusive. The inferior parietal lobule may
support more general reprocessing demands, e.g. increased demands
on verbal working memory (e.g., Jonides et al., 1998). Interestingly,
activity increases in this region have been reported for syntactic er-
rors but not for semantic anomalies (they may even result in relative
deactivations; e.g., Hagoort et al., 2004; Nieuwland et al., 2007, 2011;
Tesink et al., 2009). Sentences that are false or grammatically incor-
rect have in common that the reader or listener may automatically
tap into what the correct (i.e., true or grammatical) sentence could
be, whereas there may not be such a straightforward solution to
deal with semantically odd sentences. In contrast to the IPL, the me-
dial superior frontal and middle frontal gyrus also sometimes show
activity increases to semantic violations. In the MUC model of lan-
guage (e.g., Hagoort et al., 2009), these approximate regions map
onto the Control component that deals with the fact that the language
system must operate in a communicative context (e.g., Willems et al.,
2010). Future research can elucidate whether these neural circuits
that are sensitive to propositional truth-value are modulated by the
ease with which truth-value can be established, or by the relevance
of propositional truth-value to the unfolding discourse context.
In sum, counterfactual false sentences elicit greater activation in-
creases in RIFG than matched real-world false sentences, but not in
LIFG, consistent with greater involvement of the RIFG in counterfactu-
al discourse comprehension. These results reflect differential hemi-
spheric sensitivity to propositional truth-value of sentences about
counterfactual worlds or about the real world. Moreover, whole-
brain analyses showed that counterfactual false and real-world false
sentences both elicited activation increases in left and right inferior
prefrontal gyrus, middle and superior frontal gyrus, left middle tem-
poral gyrus and in the inferior parietal lobule, revealing a distributed
neural circuit for dealing with propositional truth-value.
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